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ABSTRACT
We study managerial incentive provision under moral hazard when growth opportu-
nities arrive stochastically and pursuing them requires a change in management. A
trade-off arises between the benefit of always having the “right” manager and the
cost of incentive provision. The prospect of growth-induced turnover limits the firm’s
ability to rely on deferred pay, resulting in more front-loaded compensation. The opti-
mal contract may insulate managers from the risk of growth-induced dismissal after
periods of good performance. The evidence for the United States broadly supports
the model’s predictions: Firms with better growth prospects experience higher CEO
turnover and use more front-loaded compensation.
WHEN OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL ARE SEPARATED, firm performance depends cru-
cially on having the right managers at the helm and incentivizing them prop-
erly. Over time, changes in business conditions may call for a change in top
management for the firm to seize new opportunities or overcome challenges.
But this may complicate the task of incentivizing incumbent managers. For in-
stance, if managers anticipate that their tenure at the firm will be short, they
will be reluctant to accept any form of deferred compensation, a standard fea-
ture of incentive contracts. The firmmay therefore face a dilemma: By changing
management to adapt to evolving business conditions, it may increase the costs
of incentive provision.
To analyze this tension, this paper introduces the idea of growth-induced
turnover into a dynamic moral hazard framework. Growth-induced turnover
refers to the replacement of top management that is motivated by the need to
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have managers who possess the appropriate skill set and experience to lead
the firm in its current circumstances. This may involve, for instance, adopting
new production techniques, making acquisitions, launching a new product, or
expanding into new markets. If the incumbent lacks the vision or skills neces-
sary to implement such transformations, appointing new management is the
only way for the firm to successfully pursue its course.1 At the same time,
proper dynamic incentive provision requires a combination of deferred com-
pensation and a threat of dismissal following poor performance, both of which
constitute agency costs. By introducing the possibility of managerial turnover
for the sake of growth as well as for discipline, we show how these costs are
affected. The main insight of the paper is that the prospect of growth-induced
dismissal effectively increases managers’ impatience, which increases agency
costs and generates a tendency to front-load compensation. In fact, the firm
may actually be better off ex ante by committing to pass up otherwise attrac-
tive growth opportunities in some circumstances. More generally, our analysis
delivers empirical predictions on the effects of a firm’s growth prospects on
managerial turnover and compensation, predictions that we show are broadly
supported in the data.
Although our analysis is set up in a continuous-time stationary environment,
we first develop the theory in the context of a two-period model. The simplicity
of the framework enables us to distill most of the economics of the paper in
a transparent way. In particular, the trade-off faced by the firm between the
benefit of having a manager who is able to seize new opportunities and the
cost of incentive provision appears starkly in this setting. Moreover, the key
empirical implications of the theory are derived analytically.
In the continuous-time model, a long-lived firm is run by a sequence of risk-
neutral managers protected by limited liability. A moral hazard problem arises
because, while they are in charge, managers can divert cash flows for their
own private benefit. The firm can fire the incumbent manager at any time and
replace him at a cost. Fleeting growth opportunities arrive stochastically over
time, and a change inmanagement is needed to seize them. If the firmdecides to
pursue an opportunity, it pays the costs associated with replacing the manager
and its size (or profitability) increases. A long-term incentive contract is signed
between the firm and its successive managers at the time they are hired.
As in previous dynamic contracting studies, we show that optimal com-
pensation and turnover policies in this environment can be described in
terms of a state variable that coincides with the agent’s expected discounted
compensation, referred to as his contractual promise. The manager receives
1 In some circumstances, a change in management may be required to avoid decay, rather than
to pursue growth—for example, when by sticking with the status quo, the firm would fail to face
up to a disruptive competitive threat. For instance, in his narrative of the battle waged in Canada
around 1820 between the long-established Hudson Bay Company (HB) and its upstart rival North
West Company (NW), Roberts (2004, p. 5) recounts that “HB did respond to the threat, essentially
by copying NW’s new approach. It did so, however, only after the leaders of the firm had been
replaced by new ones who understood the nature of the threat and were not tied to the old ways that
had worked so well for so long.” (emphasis added)
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cash compensation only when his promise reaches an endogenous bonus thresh-
old. When the manager’s promise lies below this threshold, cash compensation
is deferred, and the promise is increased at a contractually specified rate plus
a positive or negative adjustment based on the firm’s current performance. If
the firm suffers a sustained period of poor performance, the manager’s promise
can be lowered sufficiently to reach zero, the firing threshold, at which point
the incumbent is replaced by a new manager who receives an initial promise
that is no less than his exogenous reservation value.
In contrast with other studies, the manager’s contract in our framework is
also contingent on the presence or not of a growth opportunity. If no growth
opportunity becomes available, the manager continues his tenure so long as his
promise stays above the firing threshold, and he is compensated with bonuses
and performance-related changes in his promise as described above. If a growth
opportunity arises and the firm takes it, the manager is replaced. However, not
all growth opportunities are seized by all firms—even though they would be
under first-best. Specifically, we show that, depending on the characteristics of
the firm and its environment, the optimal growth policy can be one of two types.
For some firms, it is optimal to pursue all growth opportunities as they come.
For other firms, it is optimal to forgo opportunities that arise after periods of
good performance, that is, when the incumbent manager’s promise is above a
certain growth threshold. We refer to these two types of firms as high-growth
firms and low-growth firms, respectively. In effect, optimal incentive provision
in low-growth firms calls for some degree of job protection against the risk of
growth-induced termination. Intuitively, the reason job protection is granted
after a spell of good cash flows is that losses due to agency problems are re-
duced after good performance, thus increasing the value of continuing with the
incumbent manager net of the forgone benefit of growth. In high-growth firms,
the benefit of growth always dominates.
Under the optimal contract, managerial compensation is affected by the pos-
sibility of growth-induced turnover through the drift of the manager’s promise
during his tenure. In the absence of growth opportunities, this drift would sim-
ply be equal to the manager’s discount rate. The key novelty in our setup is
that, whenever the firm stands ready to seize an opportunity thatmight become
available, the drift rate needs to be augmented to compensate the manager for
the risk of growth-induced termination, with the drift modification depending
on the arrival intensity of growth opportunities. This upward adjustment of the
drift when the firm stands ready to pursue a growth opportunity explains why
firms with better growth prospects tend to have more front-loaded compensa-
tion. It also sheds light on why low-growth firms grant job protection when past
performance has been good but not if it has been bad. A higher drift is indeed
less costly to the firm after poor performance, when the manager’s promise
is close to the firing threshold, as it reduces the likelihood of a subsequent
inefficient disciplinary turnover.
Our analysis explicitly allows for the possibility of lump-sum payments, and
we show that severance pay is suboptimal in our setting even in the case of
growth-induced turnover. Indeed, it is always better for the firm to increase the
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incumbent’s future promise conditional on him being retained, thereby making
inefficient termination less likely in the future, than to give cash to a departing
manager. However, we establish that an incoming manager may be given a
“signing bonus” when his reservation value is sufficiently high.
To derive these results for the second-best incentive contract, our approach
roughly follows the same logic as in previous continuous-time analyses of dy-
namic moral hazard. First, we establish a state-space representation of long-
term incentive contracts, where the state process coincides with the manager’s
promise as described above. Similar to other studies, no stealing is incentive
compatible under a dynamic contract if the sensitivity of themanager’s promise
to reported cash flows is large enough. We next formulate the firm’s contracting
problem recursively to characterize the optimal incentive-compatible dynamic
contract in the presence of stochastic growth opportunities. We show that the
firm’s size-adjusted value function can be characterized as the solution to a
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation that incorporates the possibility of
growth-induced turnover in an intuitive way. This crucial step in the analysis
is established through a verification theorem from which the main properties
of optimal compensation and turnover policies follow. Based on the HJB, we
also provide a characterization of the determinants of a firm’s growth type. In
particular, we show that low-growth firms tend to be those plagued with more
severe agency problems. This finding suggests that better governance can work
as an effective tool to promote economic growth.
Having characterized the optimal contract, we take full advantage of the dy-
namic nature of our model and provide a suggestive analysis of its quantitative
implications for the distribution of tenure length and for the timing of man-
agerial compensation over tenure. In the model, these are partly determined
by the firm’s type as well as the compensation and growth thresholds, all of
which are endogenous. We discuss the impact of a firm’s growth prospects on
turnover and compensation under the optimal contract through a numerical
example. The simulation outcome illustrates the fact that firms with better
growth prospects, in particular, those with more attractive opportunities (i.e.,
holding their arrival intensity fixed), tend to have shorter tenure length and
more front-loaded compensation.
Finally, we examine the data in light of the theory. Merging data from
CRSP, Compustat, and ExecuComp for U.S. public companies over the pe-
riod 1992 to 2014, we investigate empirically the links between firms’ growth
prospects, CEO turnover, and CEO compensation. Following an extensive liter-
ature in empirical corporate finance, we use average Q to capture firms’ growth
prospects. Specifically, we proxy for the ex ante growth prospects of a firm at
the time a new CEO is appointed by the value of the firm’s Q in the year before
the CEO’s appointment. We first sort CEO episodes along this proxy and com-
pare the distributions of tenure length and compensation duration across the
highest and lowest quantiles of growth prospects. In line with the model predic-
tions, we find that the CEOs of firms with better prospects tend to have shorter
tenure and more front-loaded compensation. We confirm these findings using
regression analysis. In a probit model, our proxy for firms’ growth prospects is
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positively related to the likelihood of turnover, controlling for past performance.
An increase in initial Q of one standard deviation leads to an increase in the
probability of turnover of 85 basis points. Since the unconditional frequency
of CEO turnover in our sample is 8.4%, the effect is economically significant.
We also find that the arrival of an opportunity, proxied by an increase in the
firm’s average Q since the beginning of a CEO’s tenure, increases the probabil-
ity of a turnover event, consistent with the notion of growth-induced turnover.
Furthermore, the likelihood of turnover is less sensitive to the arrival of an
opportunity when ex ante growth prospects were poor, in line with the predic-
tion that firms with more modest growth prospects are more likely to insulate
their managers from the risk of growth-induced turnover. Finally, we find that
managerial pay tends to be lower in firms with worse growth prospects, and
that the slope of the compensation profile over tenure years tends to be higher
in such firms, which can be viewed as a manifestation of their greater reliance
on compensation back-loading.
The idea that the pursuit of valuable growth opportunities may rely on a
change in management can be found in early contributions to the management
literature, going back to Penrose (1959). More recently, Roberts (2004) studies
a number of business cases in whichmanagerial limitations to firm growth play
a prominent role and a change in management is instrumental in unlocking
the growth potential of a firm.2 Bertrand and Schoar (2003) provide compelling
evidence that managers do indeed matter for firm performance and that they
differ in their management styles. Bennedsen, Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, and Wolfenson
(2012) further report that CEO effects are particularly important in rapidly
growing environments. Building on the idea that firm productivity is deter-
mined by the quality of the match between the skill set of the manager and
the current circumstances of the firm, Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013) analyze a
competitive assignment model of CEO turnover where the skills demanded by
the firm are subject to random shocks. In a similar vein, Jenter and Lewellen
(2014) extend the standard Bayesian learning model of CEO turnover (e.g.,
Harris and Holmstro¨m (1982)) by allowing the quality of the firm-CEO match
to vary over time. In contrast with our work, these papers abstract from agency
issues and incentive considerations, which occupy center stage in our analysis.
Our paper relates to a large body of work that applies the tools of dynamic
contracting to the study of the firm in the presence of agency conflicts.3 In
particular, Quadrini (2004), Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), DeMarzo and
2 See in particular his discussion of the British Petroleum (BP) and General Motors (GM) cases.
Both firms achieved major increases in value by undertaking discrete changes in organizational
structure implemented by new CEOs with a different vision (John Browne at BP and “Jack” Smith
at GM) and only after a sustained period of poor performance. This can be viewed as evidence of
the type of behavior that characterizes low-growth firms in our analysis. Cheng and Hambrick
(2012) document that, in turnaround situations, companies substantially improve performance
when they replace incumbent CEOs who are poorly suited to the conditions at hand with new ones
who are well matched to those conditions.
3 For seminal contributions to the literature on dynamic moral hazard, see Rogerson (1985)
and Spear and Srivastava (1987) in discrete time, as well as Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987)
and Sannikov (2008) in continuous time. Recent applications to the study of CEO turnover and
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Fishman (2007a), Philippon and Sannikov (2007), He (2008), Biais et al. (2010),
and DeMarzo et al. (2012) investigate the link between moral hazard and firm
growth when the firm can grow with the incumbent. Our main theoretical con-
tribution is to focus instead on growth-induced turnover and its interactions
with incentive provision. To the extent that the optimal contract in our set-
ting is contingent on the realization of observable shocks, our work also bears
some similarity to Piskorski and Tchistyi (2010) and Li (2015). More specif-
ically, our continuous-time framework builds on the cash diversion model of
DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006),4 which we extend to incorporate the stochastic
arrival of growth opportunities. From a technical point of view, our contribu-
tions are as follows. First, we introduce an additional source of uncertainty
beyond the Brownian cash flow shocks. Consequently, our analysis borrows
techniques from the credit risk literature to derive the state-space representa-
tion of the contract and develop the proof of the verification theorem. Second,
we consider a stationary environment where the firm’s continuation value at
the time a manager is fired is fully endogenous. Third, we endogenize the ini-
tial promise that the firm offers to each manager. In particular, we derive a
necessary and sufficient condition for the managers’ participation constraint
to be binding in high-growth firms. Fourth, we explicitly allow for jumps in
the cumulative compensation process, which allows us to assess the optimal-
ity of severance pay. Finally, our extensive analysis of the HJB equation and
associated free-boundary problems allows us to derive explicit existence and
uniqueness results, as well as comparative statics that are new to our setting.
The implications of our model and the evidence we provide are connected to
a vast empirical literature on the determinants of turnover and compensation
for top management.5 The literature on CEO turnover has mostly focused on
the link between turnover and performance. Empirical studies in this vein in-
clude the work of Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Warner, Watts, and Wruck
(1988), Weisbach (1988), Kim (1996), and Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997), as
well as more recent contributions by Jenter and Lewellen (2014) and Jenter
and Kanaan (2015). We find that, controlling for performance, firms’ growth
prospects also help explain the likelihood of CEO turnover. In terms of man-
agerial compensation, the model predictions are in line with Murphy (1999),
who points out that pay packages often include a bonus system based on the
firm’s reported earnings in excess of a performance target. They also echo Ka-
plan and Minton (2012), who discuss the coincidence of shorter CEO tenures
and higher CEO pay in the time series. The degree of reliance on deferred
compensation has received relatively little attention in the literature so far. An
exception is the analysis by Clementi and Cooley (2010), who exploit informa-
tion on CEOs’ holdings of stocks and stock options to construct a measure of
compensation include, among others, Spear andWang (2005), Hoffman and Pfeil (2010), He (2012),
Edmans et al. (2012), and Garret and Pavan (2012, 2015).
4 See DeMarzo and Fishman (2007b) for a discrete-time version, and Biais et al. (2007) for an
analysis of convergence from discrete to continuous time.
5 For surveys of the literature on CEO compensation and on managerial incentive packages
more generally, see, for instance, Murphy (1999, 2013).
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deferred compensation. Gopalan et al. (2014) focus on the duration of a CEO’s
total compensation award in a given year based on information about the vest-
ing periods of separate components in the package. Instead, we measure the
duration of compensation received over the entire tenure of a CEO, and we
document that this measure varies negatively with the firm’s growth prospects
at the time the CEO is hired. More broadly, we add to existing empirical studies
on CEO compensation by investigating how the profile of CEO pay over tenure
relates to firms’ growth prospects.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I develops the theory in
a simple two-period framework and analytically derives its empirical impli-
cations for managerial turnover and compensation. Section II describes the
continuous-time modeling setup and derives the state-space representation of
long-term incentive contracts. Section III characterizes the optimal dynamic
contract for high-growth and low-growth firms, as well as the determinants of
firm type, and illustrates the model’s implications through simulations. Sec-
tion IV presents the empirical evidence. Section V concludes.
I. A Two-Period Model
We consider a firm that hires a manager at time t = 0 to run its operations
for at most two periods. The firm and its manager(s) are risk-neutral and have
discount rates r and , respectively, with  > r.6 The random cash flows gener-
ated by the firm’s operations at t = 1 and t = 2 are independently distributed.
The first-period cash flow Y1 is equal to either y > 0 with probability p ∈ (0,1)
or zero with probability 1− p. At the end of the first period, a growth oppor-
tunity may arrive with probability q ∈ (0,1), independently of Y1. The arrival
of a growth opportunity is publicly observable. Crucially, we assume that, in
order to pursue an available opportunity, the firm must dismiss the incumbent
manager and appoint a new one. If a growth opportunity arises and the firm
hires a newmanager to seize this opportunity, the second-period cash flow Y2 is
either (1+ γ )y with probability p, where γ > 0, or zero with probability 1− p.
If no growth opportunity arises or if the firm forgoes an available opportunity,
the firm may either continue with the incumbent manager or dismiss him and
hire a new one, in which case the distribution of Y2 is the same as that of Y1.
The assumption that the firm cannot grow without a change in management
occupies center stage in our analysis. This assumption captures circumstances
in which value creation requires specific managerial skills to carry out radical
transformations of the firm and the incumbent does not have the ability to
realize the firm’s growth potential. We let κ > 0 denote the exogenous cost of
managerial replacement at t = 1, which may include search fees as well as
6 The assumption that the agent is more impatient than the principal is standard in the dynamic
contracting literature and allows us to derive sharper predictions onmanagerial compensation (see
also footnote 20).
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indirect costs such as the disruption of ongoing business, and we assume that
the net present value of taking a growth opportunity is positive, that is,
pγ y
1+ r − κ > 0. (1)
Our analysis focuses on a second-best environment in which cash flows are
not observable by the firm. In the case of a high cash flow realization, the
manager can underreport, steal the entire cash flow, and get private benefit λ
per unit of stealing, where 0 < λ ≤ 1 captures the severity of the moral hazard
problem. We let Yˆt ≤ Yt denote the level of reported cash flow in period t, where
Yˆt has the same support as the actual cash flow Yt. Managers are protected
by limited liability and have zero reservation value.7 Thus, if the firm hires
a new manager at t = 1, it offers him a one-period incentive contract with
compensation λYˆ2 at t = 2. This is the optimal one-period contract that supports
no stealing (see Lemma IA1 in Internet Appendix Section I).8
At t = 0, the firm offers a two-period incentive contract to the initial manager.
Such a contract specifies the firm’s dismissal policy along with a compensation
policy, and both parties fully commit to the terms of the contract. Specifically,
we letG(Yˆ1) ∈ [0,1] denote the probability of taking a growth opportunity if one
arises, thereby replacingmanagement, conditional on first-period reported cash
flow.We let F(Yˆ1) ∈ [0,1] denote the probability of themanager being dismissed
at the end of the first period if no growth opportunity arises, conditional on first-
period reported cash flow. Hence, G and F determine the occurrence of growth-
induced dismissal and disciplinary dismissal, respectively. Furthermore, we
let C1(Yˆ1) and C2(Yˆ1, Yˆ2) denote the compensation received by the manager
in the first and second period, respectively, contingent on reported cash flows,
and we denote by Cg(Yˆ1) the amount of severance pay upon growth-induced
turnover. Limited liability requires
C1(Yˆ1) ≥ 0, Cg(Yˆ1) ≥ 0, and C2(Yˆ1, Yˆ2) ≥ 0. (2)
After the adoption of a two-period contract at t = 0, the timing is as follows.
At t = 1, the first-period cash flow realizes. The manager reports Yˆ1 and re-
ceives C1(Yˆ1). The uncertainty about the availability of a growth opportunity is
resolved. The manager is either retained or dismissed—with dismissal proba-
bilityG(Yˆ1) or F(Yˆ1) depending on whether a growth opportunity is available or
not. In the case of a growth-induced dismissal, the departing manager receives
Cg(Yˆ1) upon leaving office. For simplicity, we assume that the continuation
value of a dismissed manager is zero. At t = 2, the second-period cash flow re-
alizes and the initial or newly hired manager reports Yˆ2. If the initial manager
is still in office, he receives C2(Yˆ1, Yˆ2). Otherwise, the newly hired manager
receives λYˆ2.
7 With zero reservation value, limited liability ensures that the manager’s participation con-
straint is satisfied. We allow for a positive reservation value in the continuous-time model that we
study in Sections II and III.
8 The Internet Appendix may be found in the online version of this article.
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A. The Optimal Two-Period Contract
We look for a two-period contract that maximizes the firm’s expected dis-
counted profit while inducing truthful reporting by the manager. Under such
a contract, reported cash flows Yˆt coincide with actual cash flows Yt, hence we
dispense with the notational distinction.
In the second period, when the realized cash flow is high (Y2 = y), the man-
ager has the choice between truthfully reporting good performance or reporting
poor performance and stealing the cash flow. The incentive compatibility (IC)
condition requires that the manager prefer to report truthfully. This will be the
case provided that the difference in compensation upon good and bad reported
performance, C2(Y1, y)− C2(Y1,0), is sufficiently large, that is,
C2(Y1, y) ≥ λy+ C2(Y1,0). (3)
Likewise, in the first period, the manager needs to be incentivized to report
truthfully when the realized cash flow is high (Y1 = y). At this early stage,
incentives are determined by the total expected discounted payoff that the
manager receives upon reports of either good or bad performance. For a given
reportY1, his intertemporal payoff includes first-period compensation,C1(Y1)+
qG(Y1)Cg(Y1), and expected second-period pay. The latter depends on both the
probability of being retained, 1− [qG(Y1)+ (1− q)F(Y1)], and the expected pay
received at t = 2 conditional on being retained, pC2(Y1, y)+ (1− p)C2(Y1,0).
The first-period IC constraint thus requires that
C1(y)+ qG(y)Cg(y)+ (1− [qG(y)+ (1− q)F(y)]) pC2(y, y)+ (1− p)C2(y,0)1+ 
≥ λy+ C1(0)+ qG(0)Cg(0)
+ (1− [qG(0)+ (1− q)F(0)]) pC2(0, y)+ (1− p)C2(0,0)
1+  , (4)
that is, the difference in themanager’s intertemporal payoffs upon good and bad
performance needs to be sufficiently large. Importantly, (4) captures the fact
that first-period incentives are shaped by both the compensation scheme and
the firm’s dismissal policy. In particular, proper incentive provision requires
that good reported performance at t = 1 be associated with higher contem-
poraneous levels of pay, higher future levels of pay, or a lower likelihood of
dismissal.
Our first lemma characterizes the optimal compensation scheme. The proof
of this result, along with the proofs of all results derived in this section, can be
found in Internet Appendix Section I.
LEMMA 1: The compensation policy that maximizes the firm’s expected dis-
counted profit while respecting the limited liability constraint (2) and the IC
constraints (3) and (4) is such that
C1(0) = Cg(0) = C2(0,0) = C2(y,0) = 0, (5)
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C2(0, y) = C2(y, y) = λy, (6)
C1(y)+ qG(y)Cg(y) = λy− ([qG(0)+ (1− q)F(0)]
− [qG(y)+ (1− q)F(y)]) pλy
1+  . (7)
Equation (5) shows that, under the optimal contract, the manager receives
zero compensation in any given period upon a report of poor performance
in that period. Limited liability precludes a tougher penalty, that is, neg-
ative compensation. Equation (6) establishes that second-period compensa-
tion conditional on good reported cash flow at t = 2 is equal to the agency
rent λy, independent of first-period performance.9 Indeed, it is optimal to
set C2(0, y) to the minimum level that satisfies the second-period IC con-
straint (3) after poor performance, so as to relax the first-period IC con-
straint (4). On the other hand, the second-period IC constraint after good
performance is also binding because, when  > r, deferring compensation is
costly for the firm. Hence, the optimal two-period contract involves the mini-
mumamount of deferred compensation that is compatible with proper incentive
provision.
Equation (7), which follows directly from the binding first-period IC con-
straint (4), determines the level of first-period compensation upon good per-
formance, C1(y)+ qG(y)Cg(y), and establishes a crucial link between the com-
pensation and dismissal policies. While the first term on the right-hand side
of the equation, λy, is the rent that the manager would be given to report
performance truthfully at t = 1 under a one-period contract, the second term
is a distinct feature of the two-period contract. To interpret this term, recall
that if continued into the second period, the manager receives an agency rent
λy at t = 2 conditional on good second-period performance, independent of his
report in the first period. That is, a manager who is retained at t = 1 con-
templates an expected discounted payoff equal to pλy/(1+ ), regardless of
whether reported performance in the first period was good or not. Hence, a key
determinant of first-period incentives is the wedge between dismissal probabil-
ities after poor performance, qG(0)+ (1− q)F(0), and after good performance,
qG(y)+ (1− q)F(y). As (7) reveals, a larger wedge incentivizes the manager
not to steal and reduces the need to use first-period compensation upon good
performance to do so—especially when the expected discounted value of second-
period compensation is large.
It is worth noting that zero severance pay upon growth-induced turnover,
Cg(y) = Cg(0) = 0, is weakly optimal in this setup. In particular, the firm
is indifferent between granting positive severance pay Cg(y) upon growth-
induced dismissal after good performance or instead increasing regular com-
pensation C1(y) by the amount qG(y)Cg(y), taking into account the effective
9 Note that (5) and (6) imply that C2(Y1,Y2) = λY2, that is, the compensation scheme in the
second period does not depend on whether the firm is run by the initial manager or by a new
manager.
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probability qG(y) of growth-induced turnover conditional on good first-period
performance.10
Our next result characterizes the optimal turnover and growth policies.
These are captured by F(Y1) and G(Y1), which determine the conditional prob-
abilities of disciplinary dismissal and growth-induced dismissal, respectively.
LEMMA 2: The optimal contract is such that F(y) = 0. Furthermore, the follow-
ing statements hold true:
i. Setting F(0) = 1 is optimal if and only if
κ ≤ p
1− p
pλy
1+  =: κˆF(0). (8)
ii. Setting G(0) = 1 is optimal if and only if
κ ≤ p(1− λ)γ y
1+ r +
p
1− p
pλy
1+  =: κˆG(0). (9)
iii. Setting G(y) = 1 is optimal if and only if
κ ≤ p(1− λ)γ y
1+ r −
pλy
1+  =: κˆG(y). (10)
If any of the inequalities in (8), (9), or (10) is violated, it is optimal to set the
corresponding dismissal probability equal to zero.
The first part of Lemma 2 characterizes the firm’s optimal dismissal policy
in the absence of a growth opportunity, F(Y1). When no growth opportunity
is available, resorting to dismissal after good performance (i.e., F(y) > 0) is
clearly suboptimal. Indeed, this would bring no benefit and would be costly
because of the replacement cost κ > 0 and because of a deterioration in incen-
tives in the first period, which would have to be compensated by an increase in
first-period compensation upon good performance—as per (7). By contrast, the
optimal choice of F(0) involves a trade-off between incurring the replacement
cost κ and improving first-period incentives by increasing the wedge in dis-
missal probabilities. Equation (8) shows that disciplinary dismissal after poor
performance is optimal when κ is low enough or when the impact of the wedge
on the firm’s net profit is sufficiently large (i.e., high λ, high p, or low ). Fur-
thermore, a higher probability of first-period success makes it less likely that
the replacement cost κ will have to be paid while increasing the expected gain
that the firm obtains from a reduction in C1(y)+ qG(y)Cg(y), which explains
why the ratio p/(1− p) appears in the expression for the cutoff value κˆF(0).
10 In Section III, we show that zero severance pay is strictly optimal in the continuous-time
version of our model (Property 3). The reason only a weak version of this “no-severance” result
holds in the two-period setup considered in this section is that the firm’s continuation value at the
end of the first period is linear in the manager’s continuation payoff.
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Statements (ii) and (iii) in Lemma 2 characterize the firm’s optimal growth
policy, G(Y1). The direct gain from taking an available growth opportunity is
to improve the distribution of the second-period cash flow. The benefit for the
firm, captured by the term p(1− λ)γ y/(1+ r) in (9) and (10), is increasing in p
and γ and is decreasing in λ and r. The firm’s growth policy also affects profit
indirectly via its impact on the dismissal wedge and first-period incentives.
On the one hand, systematically taking growth opportunities after poor perfor-
mance facilitates incentive provision. Thus, as revealed by (9), only very high
values of the replacement cost κ would make it optimal for the firm to forgo
an available growth opportunity after poor performance. On the other hand,
replacing management to take a growth opportunity after good performance
is detrimental to incentive provision and is therefore less attractive, that is,
κˆG(y) < κˆG(0).11
In the remainder of this section, we assume that
p
1− p ≥
1+ 
1+ r γ. (11)
Combined with (1), this restriction implies that κ < κˆG(0) and therefore ensures
that the firm systematically pursues growth opportunities after poor perfor-
mance.12 However, it may or may not be optimal for the firm to also pursue an
available growth opportunity after good performance, as our next result shows.
In what follows, we distinguish between two types of configurations: we refer
to the case G(y) = 1 as the high-growth regime and to the case G(y) = 0 as the
low-growth regime. In the former configuration the firm pursues any growth
opportunity that arises, while in the latter it pursues an available growth
opportunity only upon poor performance.
LEMMA 3: High-growth and low-growth regimes can both arise.
The main insight delivered by Lemma 3 is that some firms—namely, low-
growth firms—may find it preferable to forgo a growth opportunity following
good performance even though they would undertake any such opportunity un-
der first-best, as implied by (1). Indeed, under second-best, it can be optimal for
a firm to commit ex ante to forgo growth opportunities after good performance
to reduce the cost of incentive provision.
The following lemma characterizes the determinants of a firm’s growth
regime, thus shedding light on the circumstances under which it is optimal
for the firm to grant partial job protection to the initial manager.
11 Note that κˆG(0) > κˆF(0), so if the firm stands ready to fire the manager after poor performance
absent a growth opportunity, then a fortiori it will fire him after poor performance for the sake
of growth. If growing the firm involved a specific cost χ > 0, then κˆG(y) and κˆG(0) would both be
translated to the left by χ , making it less likely that growth opportunities are undertaken, but
none of the results below would be affected.
12 This assumption, which effectively rules out the possibility that the firm never grows, only
serves to simplify the exposition and shorten some of the proofs. All of the empirical implications
stated in Propositions 1 and 2 remain true if condition (11) is relaxed.
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LEMMA 4: An increase in γ , y, , or p or a drop in λ, r, or κ can induce a switch
from a low-growth to a high-growth regime. A change in q has no impact on the
optimal growth policy.
Lemma 4 establishes that firms with better opportunities (i.e., high γ ) tend
to fully expose their managers to the risk of growth-induced turnover. Firms
with smaller discount rates (i.e., low r) tend to do the same as they give more
weight to the future benefit from growth relative to the compensating increase
in first-period compensation. By contrast, firms facing larger turnover costs
(i.e., high κ) have a natural tendency to grant partial job protection to their
managers, thus forgoing growth opportunities after good performance. Low-
growth firms also tend to be plagued by severe agency issues (i.e., high λ).
Indeed, as reflected in the expression for the threshold κˆG(y) in (10), a high
dismissal probability G(y) is less appealing when moral hazard is more severe,
because both the fraction of enhanced second-period cash flows accruing to the
firm (1− λ) is small and the second-period agency rent is large—implying that
any increase in the risk of growth-induced dismissal needs to be matched by a
larger increase in C1(y)+ qG(y)Cg(y) to keep the agent incentivized.
B. Empirical Implications
In this section, we derive some of the empirical implications that arise in this
simple two-period framework combining growth-induced turnover and moral
hazard. The following two propositions summarize the theoretical predictions
for managerial turnover and managerial compensation, respectively.
PROPOSITION 1: The following statements hold true:
i. The likelihood of turnover is decreasing in performance, that is,
qG(y)+ (1− q)F(y) ≤ qG(0)+ (1− q)F(0).
ii. The likelihood of turnover, qG(Y1)+ (1− q)F(Y1), is increasing in the
quality of growth opportunities, γ , and in their arrival probability, q.
iii. The probability of turnover is higher when a growth opportunity arises,
that is,
G(Y1) ≥ F(Y1).
Moreover, the impact of the arrival of a growth opportunity on the probability
of turnover is stronger in firms with better opportunities, that is, G(Y1)− F(Y1)
is increasing in γ .
The results derived in Proposition 1 follow immediately from Lemmas 2 and
4. Statement (i) establishes a negative relationship between firm performance
and turnover. This is a standard prediction of dynamic moral hazard models. In
particular, the result would hold equally true under second-best in the absence
of growth-induced turnover (i.e., in the limit as q goes to zero), when dismissal
upon poor performance is used purely as an incentive device. The prediction
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carries over to our setup because growth-induced dismissal is also less likely to
occur after good performance. Statements (ii) and (iii) characterize the impact
of ex ante growth prospects and the effect of a growth opportunity realization on
the likelihood of turnover, respectively. These predictions are driven primarily
by the possibility of growth-induced dismissal introduced in our setup.13
The second set of empirical implications emphasizes important features of
the compensation scheme under the optimal two-period contract. In particular,
when thinking about taking the model predictions to the data, it is useful
to consider the average compensation profile (C¯1, C¯2), where C¯t denotes the
expected level of compensation that the initial manager receives at time t
conditional on running operations in period t:
C¯1 = p[C1(y)+ qG(y)Cg(y)] and C¯2 = pλy.
PROPOSITION 2: The following statements hold true:
i. Compensation is increasing in performance, that is,
C1(y)+ qG(y)Cg(y) > C1(0)+ qG(0)Cg(0) and C2(Y1, y) > C2(Y1,0).
ii. The average compensation profile is increasing over tenure, that is, C¯1 ≤
C¯2.
iii. Average first-period compensation C¯1 is increasing in the quality of growth
opportunities, γ . Hence, the slope of the compensation profile, C¯2 − C¯1, is
decreasing in γ .
The first statement in Proposition 2 establishes a positive relationship be-
tween firm performance and managerial compensation, which immediately
follows from Lemma 1.14 The other two results in the proposition characterize
the shape of the average compensation profile (C¯1, C¯2). While statement (ii)
shows that the compensation profile is back-loaded, statement (iii) empha-
sizes that the extent of compensation back-loading depends on the firm’s ex
ante growth prospects.15 Specifically, the model predicts that firms with bet-
ter growth prospects tend to have more front-loaded pay. Indeed, as Lemma 4
shows, an improvement in the quality of growth opportunities makes it more
likely that the firm finds it optimal to fully expose the initial manager to
the risk of growth-induced turnover, setting G(y) = 1. In turn, the associated
decrease in the dismissal wedge needs to be compensated by an increase in
C1(y)+ qG(y)Cg(y) to satisfy the first-period IC constraint (see equation (7)),
13 It is worth noting, however, that, under the assumption that growth is efficient (see condi-
tion (1)), the comparative statics with respect to γ in statements (ii) and (iii) would not hold true
under first-best.
14 Compensation increases with recent performance, not with the entire history of performance.
Indeed, C2(Y1,Y2) is independent of Y1, that is, second-period pay does not depend on first-period
performance.
15 The inequality in statement (ii), like that in Proposition 1(i), is strict unless F(0) = 0 and
G(y) = 1. Necessary and sufficient conditions for this case to arise are provided in the proof of
Proposition 2 in the Internet Appendix.
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which translates into an increase in the average first-period compensation level
C¯1. It is worth noting that, whereas statements (i) and (ii) are driven by moral
hazard and would also hold true under second-best in the absence of growth-
induced dismissal, the last prediction is specific to our setup and is driven by
the interaction between moral hazard and the possibility of growth-induced
turnover.
II. The Continuous-Time Model
Having previewed the basic economics of growth-induced managerial
turnover and its interaction with moral hazard, we now turn to the main
focus of our analysis and consider the continuous-time stationary version of
the environment introduced in Section I. This modeling setup is better able
to fully capture the dynamic nature of the agency relationship between a firm
and any of its successive managers.
We consider a firm run by a sequence of managers protected by limited
liability. The firm and its managers are risk-neutral, with discount rates r and
, respectively. The firm’s operations generate a stream of instantaneous cash
flows t dYt, where t denotes the size of the firm at time t, and the cumulative
size-adjusted cash flow process Y = {Yt} follows
dYt = μdt + σ dZt, μ, σ > 0,
where Z = {Zt} denotes a standard one-dimensional Brownian motion. The
firm starts with unit size (0 = 1) and can later expand. At any point in time,
two conditions must be met for the firm to expand: (i) it must have a growth
opportunity, and (ii) it must hire a new manager to take up the opportunity.
Growth opportunities arrive sequentially, independent of cash flow shocks,
and the waiting time for the arrival of the next opportunity is exponentially
distributed with parameter q. If not taken immediately, an opportunity is lost
and no further growth is possible until a new one arrives.
As in the context of the two-period framework studied in the previous section,
the assumption that value creation entails a change in management is central
to our analysis. For convenience, we model value enhancement as a discrete
change in firm size that scales up the distribution of cash flows.We assume that,
when the firm expands, the size of the firm increases by a factor 1+ γ > 1. Firm
growth, when it occurs, is the result of bringing in a new manager able to take
advantage of newly available opportunities—thereby achieving a permanent
increase in expected cash flows.16
The second main feature of the model is a standard agency problem arising
from the fact that, while running the firm’s operations, managers can divert
cash flows. The residual cash flow received by the firm is t (dYt − dAt), where
16 This may or may not involve an increase in the fixed assets of the firm. If it does, future scaled
cash flows should be thought of as net of the financing cost of capital investments.
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A= {At} denotes the cumulative size-adjusted amount of “stealing.”17 Man-
agers enjoy a private benefit λ ∈ (0,1] for each unit of diverted cash flow, so
that λ measures the severity of moral hazard.
The firm has deep pockets and can cover negative cash flows as well as the
costs associated with managerial compensation and turnover. As a result, the
firm’s decisions are not driven by financing constraints. A manager hired to
run the firm at size t has reservation value w¯t, and the cost of replacing him
is κt, where w¯, κ > 0 are given constants. While it is natural to assume that
the manager’s reservation value (which can be interpreted as a nonpecuniary
cost of running the firm) and the cost of managerial replacement (which may
include disruption costs) are increasing in firm size; the stronger assumption of
proportionality is made to ensure size homogeneity and preserve tractability.18
The continuation value of a departing manager is equal to zero.19
We further assume that
 >r, (12)
r >qγ, (13)
γμ
r
>κ + (1+ γ )w¯, (14)
and we refer to parameter values that satisfy these conditions, along with those
previously imposed in this section, as permissible. Condition (12) implies that
managers are more impatient than the firm.20 Condition (13) implies that the
average growth rate when the firm takes all growth opportunities is smaller
than the firm’s discount rate, which ensures finite valuation. Finally, together
with (13), condition (14) implies that, in the absence of moral hazard, it would
be optimal for the firm to take all growth opportunities—as we next establish.
A. First-Best Policy
The first-best policy can be characterized as follows. First, the optimal com-
pensation policy involves giving to a manager a size-adjusted transfer w¯ at the
17 The stealing strategy A chosen by the manager is adapted to the Brownian filtration and
has continuous sample paths. Given that Y is continuous, any jump in A would be immediately
detected by the firm.
18 Empirically, executive pay is positively correlated with firm size both over time and across
firms, as documented by Kostiuk (1990), Murphy (1999), and Gabaix and Landier (2008). On the
other hand, estimates of the various costs associated with CEO transitions for mid-cap companies
are roughly twice as large as those borne by small-cap companies, and less than half the costs
borne by large-cap companies (Nat Stoddard and Claire Wyckoff, “The Costs of CEO Failure,”
Chief Executive Magazine, Nov/Dec, 2008). Biais et al. (2010) and DeMarzo et al. (2012) make
proportionality assumptions similar to ours.
19 Allowing for a nonzero continuation value would alter the details of our analysis to the extent
that this would affect the dynamics of the manager’s promise (20) as well as the HJB equation (28).
20 This assumption is standard in the dynamic contracting literature (e.g., DeMarzo and San-
nikov (2006), Biais et al. (2007), Biais et al. (2010), and DeMarzo et al. (2012)). The wedge in
discount rates rules out indefinitely postponing payments to managers.
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outset of his tenure. Indeed, since managers are more impatient than the firm,
deferring compensation would affect firm value negatively. Second, to reduce
replacement and hiring costs, managerial turnover only occurs for the sake of
pursuing a growth opportunity. Third, the optimal growth policy involves either
pursuing all growth opportunities or never pursuing any. If the firm pursues
all opportunities, its expected discounted profit V ∗ satisfies
V ∗ = −w¯ + E
[∫ τ
0
e−rtdYt + e−rτ [(1+ γ )V ∗ − κ]
]
,
where τ is the random arrival time of the first growth opportunity. Solving for
V ∗ under the assumption that τ is exponentially distributed with parameter q
yields
V ∗ = μ − qκ
r − qγ −
r + q
r − qγ w¯.
If instead the firm forgoes all opportunities, its expected discounted profit is
given by
−w¯ + E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtdYt
]
= −w¯ + μ
r
.
It is straightforward to see that conditions (13) and (14) are sufficient for the
inequality
V ∗ > max
{
−w¯ + μ
r
, 0
}
to hold. Therefore, our assumptions ensure that it would be optimal for the
firm to pursue all growth opportunities under first-best.
B. Long-Term Incentive Contract
Wenow turn to the case in whichmanagers can divert cash flows and stealing
is not observable by the firm. The firm enters into a long-term contract with
eachmanager at the time he is hired, and both parties fully commit to the terms
of the contract. A contract specifies circumstances under which the manager
will be dismissed, including when the firm pursues a growth opportunity, as
well as themanager’s pay over the course of his tenure based on the information
that becomes available to the firm over time. The arrival of a growth oppor-
tunity is assumed to be perfectly observable and contractible. To fix ideas and
simplify the exposition, we initially restrict our attention to the contract with
the first manager. Readers interested in the technical aspects of the sequential
contracting environment are referred to Internet Appendix Section II.
First, we discuss how dismissal and compensation are determined for a given
stealing strategy A. The information available to the firm comes from observing
the cumulative reported cash flows Yˆ = Y − A, as well as the arrival of growth
opportunities.We denote byFt the information gathered by the firmup to time t,
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which includes information about the occurrence of growth opportunities. We
denote by Fˆt ⊆ Ft the information that comes only from the history of reported
cash flows up to time t.
The manager can be dismissed for two distinct reasons in our setting. First,
the manager can be sacked for poor reported performance. By committing ex
ante to fire the incumbent after a history of poor reported cash flows, the
firm can incentivize the manager not to steal. Second, the firm can replace
the manager to pursue a growth opportunity that becomes available. Hence,
turnover is governed in part by the firm’s growth policy, which determines the
firm’s response to the potential arrival of a growth opportunity. This policy
is modeled by an (Fˆt)-progressively measurable process G = {Gt} that takes
values in {0,1}, with Gt = 1 indicating that the firm stands ready to pursue
a growth opportunity at time t and Gt = 0 indicating that it does not.21 By
controlling G, the firm effectively determines the instantaneous intensity of
growth-induced dismissal, which is equal to qGt at time t.
Using the notation x ∧ y (respectively, x ∨ y) to denote the minimum (max-
imum) of x and y, the random time τ at which the manager is fired can be
represented as
τ = τd ∧ τg,
where τd denotes an (Fˆt)-stopping time and the random time τg satisfies22
P(τg > t | Fˆt) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
qGs ds
)
. (15)
In the event that τ = τd, the manager is replaced for the sake of incentive
provision, which we refer to as disciplinary turnover. When instead τ = τg, the
manager is dismissed for the sake of growth, which we refer to as growth-
induced turnover.
Compensation to the manager over the course of his tenure is captured by
an (Fˆt)-adapted cumulative compensation process C = {Ct}. Limited liability
implies that C is increasing. A positive jump 
Ct represents a lump-sum pay-
ment at time t.23 In particular, 
C0 and 
Cτd denote a signing bonus and
severance pay upon disciplinary dismissal, respectively. To capture severance
pay upon growth-induced turnover, we introduce a separate (Fˆt)-progressively
21 In the Internet Appendix, we allow G to take values in [0, 1] and show that randomization of
the growth decision is suboptimal.
22 The left-hand side of (15) denotes the probability that the manager has not been dismissed
for the sake of growth by time t, conditional on the history of reported cash flows up to time t. The
right-hand side captures the fact that the instantaneous intensity of growth-induced dismissal at
time s ≤ t is qGs. When the firm stands ready to pursue all growth opportunities, in which case
G ≡ 1, the probability that the manager survives the threat of growth-induced termination up to
time t is given by exp(−qt), reflecting the fact that the arrival of opportunities is exponentially
distributed with parameter q.
23 We assume that C is right continuous with left limits and C0− = 0, and hence 
Ct = Ct − Ct−
and 
C0 = C0. Further details on the modeling of long-term incentive contracts are given in
Internet Appendix Section II.A.
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measurable process S = {St}. The amount of severance received by a manager
dismissed for the sake of growth is given by Sτg .
Now consider the set A of all possible stealing strategies. A contract can be
viewed as a function mapping each stealing strategy A∈ A to a collection
C = C(A), S = S(A), G = G(A), and τd = τd(A),
as just described. Such mapping should be consistent across stealing strategies
in the sense that any given history of reported cash flows should result in the
same compensation and termination outcomes, independent of the underlying
combination of true cash flows and stealing that gave rise to that observed
history. The contract space G identifies with the set of all functionals  : A →
(C(A), S(A),G(A), τd(A)) on A that satisfy this requirement.
C. The Firm’s Problem
Given a contract  and a stealing strategy A, the manager’s expected dis-
counted payoff at the time he is hired is given by
M(, A) = E
[∫
[0,τ [
e−t (dCt + λdAt)+ e−τ (
Cτd1{τ=τd} + Sτg1{τ=τg})
]
.
For a given contract , a stealing strategy A is said to be incentive compatible if
it maximizes the manager’s payoff. We refer to a contract as admissible if it is
such that (i) no stealing is incentive compatible and (ii) the manager’s expected
discounted payoff under no stealing is greater than or equal to his reservation
value w¯. Formally, the subset Ga of admissible contracts includes all contracts
 ∈ G such that
M(,0) = sup
A∈A
M(, A) and M(,0) ≥ w¯.
Given an admissible contract , the firm’s expected discounted profit at t = 0
is
F() = E
[∫
[0,τ ]
e−rt (μdt − dCt)+ e−rτ ([Vd − 
Cτd − κ]1{τ=τd}
+ [Vg − Sτg − κ]1{τ=τg})
]
, (16)
where Vd and Vg denote the firm’s continuation values after dismissal of the
first manager (for disciplinary reasons or to pursue a growth opportunity, re-
spectively), which we endogenize below in Section III.24 The firm’s problem is
24 In Internet Appendix Section II.B, we provide an expression for the firm’s value at t = 0 for
a given sequence of admissible contracts. In particular, when the same admissible contract  is
offered to all managers, we show that the firm’s size-adjusted expected discounted profit F()
satisfies (16) with Vd = F() and Vg = (1+ γ )F(). We restrict our attention to contracts that
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to find an admissible contract that maximizes its expected discounted profit.
Formally, the firm’s objective is to find ∗ such that
F(∗) = sup
∈Ga
F().
D. Admissible Dynamic Contracts
As in previous work on dynamic moral hazard, the challenge in analyzing
this type of environment comes from the complexity of the contract space and
from the difficulty one faces in evaluating agents’ incentives in a tractable way.
In this section, we build on the approach of DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006),
Sannikov (2008), Biais et al. (2007), and Biais et al. (2010) and consider a
state-space representation of incentive contracts. Under no stealing, the state
variable in this representation should coincide with the manager’s expected
payoff. As a preliminary step, we characterize the dynamics of
Mt = E
[∫
]t,τ [
e−(s−t)dCs + e−(τ−t)(
Cτd,1{τ=τd} + Sτg1{τ=τg})
∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
, t < τ,
which represents the manager’s expected future payoff at time t < τ when he
refrains from stealing.25
LEMMA 5: For any given contract  ∈ G, there exists a process β = {βt} such that
dMt = [Mt + qGt(Mt − St)]dt − dCt + σβt dZt, for t < τ. (17)
PROOF: See Internet Appendix Section III.A. 
The presence of the diffusion term in the dynamics of the agent’s expected
payoff is natural. Since compensation and dismissal policies are contingent
on the history of reported cash flows, the evolution of the manager’s expected
future payoff under a long-term incentive contract is sensitive to currently
reported cash flows. The process β can be interpreted as the sensitivity induced
by a long-term contract. Since reported cash flows coincide with true cash
flows when the manager refrains from stealing, the stochastic evolution of the
manager’s expected payoff under no stealing Mt is driven directly by the true
cash flow shocks dZt.
implement no stealing, which is standard in the literature when moral hazard is modeled as a
cash diversion problem (e.g., see DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006)).
25 It is worth noting that, in our model, uncertainty is driven not only by the Brownian cash
flow shock but also by the stochastic arrival of growth opportunities. As a result, the derivation of
(17) does not rely simply on the martingale representation theorem, as in the standard martingale
approach developed by Sannikov (2008), but rather also on a “change in filtration” formula and
other techniques borrowed from the credit risk literature.
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In light of Lemma 5, we consider dynamic contracts whose implementation
is driven by a state process W = {Wt} that evolves according to
dWt = [Wt + qGt(Wt − St)]dt − dCt + βt (dYˆt − μdt). (18)
Along with compensation and growth policies, a dynamic contract specifies the
sensitivity β of the state variable W to the reported cash flows. Importantly,
since the dynamics of the state variable are driven by processes that are either
observed or controlled by the firm, its evolution over time can be tracked by
the firm. While growth-induced turnover is jointly determined by the growth
policy and the random arrival of opportunities, disciplinary dismissal occurs
when the state process W hits zero, that is,
τd = inf{t ≥ 0 : Wt = 0}. (19)
Noting that dYˆt − μdt = −dAt + σ dZt, it is straightforward to see that, when
the manager refrains from stealing, the dynamics of the state process become
dWt = [Wt + qGt(Wt − St)]dt − dCt + σβt dZt (20)
and hence mirror (17). Indeed, when the manager refrains from stealing, the
value taken by the state variable at any time during his tenure coincides with
his expected future compensation under the contract, as stated in the following
lemma.
LEMMA 6: Consider a dynamic contract with termination occurring at time
τ = τg ∧ τd, where τg satisfies (15), τd is defined by (19), and W follows (18)
for some initial condition W0− = winit > 0. Then the manager’s expected future
payoff at time t < τ if he refrains from stealing is equal to Wt, that is,
Wt = E
[∫
]t,τ [
e−(s−t)dCs + e−(τ−t)(
Cτd1{τ=τd} + Sτg1{τ=τg})
∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
, (21)
on the event {t < τ }. Moreover, if β ≥ λ, it is optimal for the manager not to steal.
PROOF: See Internet Appendix Section III.C. 
Equation (21) confirms that the state process W under a dynamic contract
can be interpreted as the manager’s expected future payoff if he refrains from
stealing, which we refer to as the manager’s promise. Lemma 6 also establishes
an incentive compatibility condition, extending the one derived by DeMarzo
and Sannikov (2006) to our environment with growth-induced turnover. This
condition is intuitive: Since the manager enjoys a private benefit λ per unit of
diverted cash, incentivizing the manager not to steal requires that his promise
increases by at least λ for each extra unit of reported cash flow, that is, β ≥
λ. A dynamic contract is admissible if it satisfies this condition as well as
the initial promise condition W0− ≥ w¯. Since β ≥ λ > 0 under an admissible
dynamic contract, (18) and (19) imply that inefficient disciplinary turnover
occurs as a result of poor reported cash flows.
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Before proceeding further, it is important to observe that, relative to the
environment considered in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), the introduction
of growth-induced turnover affects the dynamics of the agent’s promise in a
substantial way. The key difference lies in the drift of the promise, which in
our setup is equal to Wt + qGt(Wt − St) instead of simply Wt. The reason
for this difference is that, whenever the manager is at risk of being fired for
the sake of growth (i.e., whenever Gt = 1), he needs to be “compensated” for
the loss that he would incur if a growth opportunity arises. The potential loss
corresponds to the difference (Wt − St) between the manager’s current promise
and the severance pay he would receive if replaced for the sake of growth,
while the chances of incurring such a loss are determined by the instantaneous
intensity of growth-induced dismissal qGt. Compensation for the risk of growth-
induced termination comes in the form of an augmented drift, which translates
into a faster increase in the manager’s promise in states of the world in which
no growth opportunity materializes. In other words, in our setup the law of
motion for the agent’s promise is modified in such a way that the promise-
keeping condition remains satisfied.
III. Optimal Dynamic Contract
Having characterized the set of admissible dynamic contracts, we reformu-
late the firm’s optimization problem as a stochastic control problem. We denote
by V (φ,w) the firm’s value function, which gives the firm’s expected discounted
profit at a given current size φ and for a given size-adjusted promise w to the
incumbent manager. The firm’s value function satisfies the recursive dynamic
programming equation
V (φ,w) = sup
C,S,G,β
E
[
φ
∫
[0,τ [
e−rt(μdt − dCt)− φe−rτ
(

Cτd1{τ=τd} + Sτg1{τ=τg}
)
+ e−rτ (−κφ + Vd1{τ=τd} + Vg1{τ=τg})
]
, (22)
where
τ = τd ∧ τg, Vd = V
(
φ,w
φ
h
)
, and Vg = V
(
(1+ γ )φ,w(1+γ )φh
)
, (23)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint β ≥ λ and subject to (15), (19),
and (20) with initial conditionW0− = w. In this formulation,C and S denote the
manager’s size-adjusted cumulative compensation and size-adjusted severance
upon growth, respectively, and the continuation values Vd and Vg involve hiring
promises
w
φ
h = w¯ ∨ argmax
w>0
V (φ,w) and w(1+γ )φh = w¯ ∨ argmax
w>0
V ((1+ γ )φ,w),
(24)
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respectively. Expression (24) captures the possibility that a new manager’s
participation constraint may not be binding, as it may be optimal for the firm
to give him a rent in excess of his reservation value. Since cash flows, turnover
costs, and reservation values are all proportional to firm size, it follows that
firm value itself is homogeneous in size, that is,
V (φ,w) = φV (1, w) =: φv(w). (25)
In particular, stationarity and size homogeneity imply that the firm offers the
same dynamic contract to all successive managers. Using (22) to (25), the size-
adjusted value function v(w) is determined along with the optimal contract
by
v(w) = sup
C,S,G,β
E
[∫
[0,τ ]
e−rt(μdt − dCt)− e−rτ
(

Cτd1{τ=τd} + Sτg1{τ=τg}
)
+ e−rτ (−κ + v(wh)1{τ=τd} + (1+ γ )v(wh)1{τ=τg})
]
(26)
subject to the same constraints as above, where the size-adjusted hiring
promise wh satisfies
wh = w¯ ∨ argmax
w>0
v(w). (27)
The following proposition is central to our characterization of the optimal dy-
namic contract.
PROPOSITION 3: Let u : R+ → R be a concave C2 function that satisfies the HJB
equation
max
{
σ 2λ2
2
u′′(w)+ wu′(w)− ru(w)+ μ
+ q [(1+ γ )u(wh)− κ + wu′(w)− u(w)]+ ,−u′(w)− 1
}
= 0 (28)
with boundary condition
u(0) = u(wh)− κ, (29)
where wh = w¯ ∨ argmaxw>0u(w). Also, suppose that limw↓0 |u′(w)| < ∞ and
u′(w) = −1 for some w < ∞. Then the function u identifies with the value func-
tion v defined by (26), that is, v(w) = u(w) for all w ≥ 0. Moreover, the optimal
dynamic contract satisfies Properties 1 to 5 below.
PROOF: See Internet Appendix Section IV. 
We rely on Proposition 3 to construct the firm’s value function and solve for
the optimal dynamic contract. As observed in previous work on dynamic moral
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hazard, the concavity of the value function is related to the fact that a change in
w affects firm value not only directly by increasing the amount of compensation
owed to the manager, but also via its impact on the likelihood of disciplinary
turnover. Indeed, by reducing the prospect of costly disciplinary turnover, a
one-dollar increase in the agent’s promise effectively costs the firm less than
one dollar. Moreover, since the probability of disciplinary turnover is higher
after poor performance, the reduction in agency costs induced by a marginal
increase in the agent’s promise is larger for low values of w. This is what gives
rise to concavity.
A. Optimality Properties
We now turn to the properties satisfied by the optimal dynamic contract,
as implied by Proposition 3. These properties impose restrictions on the cash
flow sensitivity, the compensation policy, and the growth policy. The first two
properties also hold in the absence of growth opportunities and are derived in
that context by DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and Biais et al. (2007).26
PROPERTY 1: The optimal contract has sensitivity to reported cash flows β = λ.
The fact that the incentive compatibility constraint should hold as an equality
(β = λ) is related to the concavity of the value function. Intuitively, reducing
the volatility of the manager’s promise as much as possible while satisfying
incentive compatibility is optimal for the firm because it lowers the probability
that the promise hits zero, which would result in ex post inefficient disciplinary
turnover.
PROPERTY 2: The optimal compensation policy is such that themanager receives
transfers only if his current promisew is at leastwc. The compensation threshold
wc satisfies
v′(wc) = −1.
This property can be explained heuristically by observing that, at any in-
stant, the firm has the option to make an immediate transfer to the manager
and continue optimally. Hence, the inequality v(w) ≥ −ε + v(w − ε) holds for
any transfer ε, which implies v′(w) ≥ −1. When the manager’s current promise
w is such that v′(w) > −1, deferring compensation is optimal. By concavity
of the value function, this happens when w is below the point wc that satis-
fies v′(wc) = −1. In this case, the manager receives no compensation until his
promise reaches the compensation threshold. If w¯ > wc, the manager receives
a signing bonus 
C0 = w¯ − wc when appointed, and his promise later remains
in the interval [0, wc].27
26 From a broader perspective, the smooth pasting condition in Property 2 is a standard feature
of the solution to singular stochastic control problems such as that given by (26). See Benesˇ, Shepp,
and Witsenhausen (1980) and Karatzas (1983) for early references.
27 Technically, the agent’s promise W is reflected at wc by the cumulative compensation process.
A rigorous construction of this process is provided in Internet Appendix Section IV (see Theorem
Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover 443
PROPERTY 3: The optimal compensation policy involves no severance payment,
that is, 
Cτd = 0 and S = 0.
Property 3 establishes that severance pay is strictly suboptimal in the
continuous-time setting, even in the case of growth-induced termination. The
reason is that, rather than give cash to a departing manager, the firm is al-
ways better off increasing the promise of the incumbent conditional on him
being retained, which has the benefit of reducing the likelihood of inefficient
turnover later.28 This result is in contrast to the indifference result that holds
in the two-period model where disciplinary dismissal can occur only at the end
of the first period (see the discussion following Lemma 1 and footnote 10). It is
also worth noting that the no-severance result upon growth-induced dismissal
relies crucially on the assumption that the arrival of a growth opportunity is
contractible.29
PROPERTY 4: It is optimal for the firm to stand ready to pursue a growth oppor-
tunity if and only if the manager’s current promise w is such that
(1+ γ )v(wh)− κ + wv′(w) ≥ v(w). (30)
Condition (30), which we refer to as the growth optimality condition, deter-
mines the circumstances under which growth-induced turnover can occur. The
inequality implies that the optimal growth policy relies not only on a compari-
son between the status quo continuation value v(w) and the continuation value
upon growth (1+ γ )v(wh)− κ. Rather, the extra term wv′(w) accounts for the
fact that putting the manager at risk of being fired if a growth opportunity
arrives requires that he be compensated in the form of an augmented drift,
as discussed in Section II.D. When the firm’s value function is decreasing at
the current value of the agent’s promise (i.e., v′(w) < 0), this higher drift con-
stitutes a cost. If this cost is high relative to the potential gains from growth,
so that (1+ γ )v(wh)− κ + wv′(w)− v(w) < 0, it is optimal for the firm to insu-
late the incumbent manager from the risk of being replaced and thus forgo
growth opportunities when they become available. We refer to this possibility
as contractual job protection.
IA2). One way in which the introduction of stochastic growth opportunities and growth-induced
turnover modifies the firm’s compensation policy is by affecting the value of the optimal threshold
wc.
28 By the same logic, severance pay would be suboptimal in a simpler setting with exogenous
random exit of the manager. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for making this observation.
29 Positive severance upon growth-induced dismissal would arise as part of the optimal contract
if the availability of a growth opportunity were privately observed by the incumbent manager (see
Anderson, Bustamante, and Guibaud (2012)). This result is reminiscent of Eisfeldt and Rampini
(2008) and Inderst and Mueller (2010), although severance pay serves to incentivize the incubent
to reveal bad news in their setups. Severance pay upon disciplinary dismissal arises in the model
analyzed by He (2012) with a risk-averse agent and private savings.
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PROPERTY 5: If partial job protection arises as part of the optimal contract, the
firm forgoes growth opportunities if the manager’s promise w is above wg, where
the growth threshold wg satisfies
wg = sup{w ≥ 0 : (1+ γ )v(wh)− κ + wv′(w)− v(w) ≥ 0} < wc.
This property indicates that if some degree of job protection arises as part of
the optimal incentive contract, managers are shielded from the risk of growth-
induced turnover after good performance. Intuitively, the benefit of retaining
the incumbent, net of the forgone gains from growth, is increasing in w be-
cause losses due to moral hazard under the incumbent are lower after good
performance.30
B. Two Types of Firms
In light of our discussion of Properties 4 and 5, two configurations can arise—
echoing the two growth regimes encountered in the analysis of the two-period
model. In the first configuration, the growth optimality condition (30) holds
for all values of the manager’s promise w ∈ [0, wc]. We refer to firms falling
into this configuration as high-growth firms. In such firms, managers are fully
exposed to the risk of being fired for the sake of growth, and the instantaneous
rate of growth-induced turnover is always equal to q. Over the course of the
manager’s tenure, the firm keeps track of the evolution of
dWt = ( + q)Wt dt − dCt + λ (dYˆt − μdt), W0− = wh,
where transfers dC reflect the manager’s promise W at the endogenous com-
pensation thresholdwc. Transfers to themanager can be interpreted as bonuses
indexed on reported earnings in excess of a performance target, as documented
in Murphy (1999). The manager is dismissed when a growth opportunity arises
or when W hits zero, whichever comes first.
By contrast, in the second possible configuration, the growth optimality con-
dition does not hold everywhere on the interval [0, wc], and some degree of job
protection is part of the optimal contract. We refer to firms falling into the latter
configuration as low-growth firms. The contract offered by a low-growth firm
specifies, along with a compensation threshold wc, a growth threshold wg < wc.
Over the course of the manager’s tenure, the firm keeps track of
dWt = [ + q1[0,wg](Wt)]Wt dt − dCt + λ (dYˆt − μdt), W0− = wh,
where bonus transfers dC reflect W at wc. The manager is dismissed if a
growth opportunity arises whenWt ≤ wg or whenW hits zero, whichever comes
first. Consistent with our discussion of Property 5, the optimal contract in
low-growth firms requires that, whenever the manager’s promise is above the
30 In otherwords, the net benefit of exposing amanager to the risk of growth-induced termination
is decreasing in themanager’s promise, as revealed by the fact that (1+ γ )v(wh)− κ + wv′(w)− v(w)
is decreasing in w. This is in line with the observation that κˆG(y) < κˆG(0) in the two-period model.
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growth threshold wg, the firm forgoes any growth opportunity that becomes
available.31
The insights obtained from our analysis of the two-period model in Section I
are useful to understanding why the low-growth configuration may sometimes
be optimal even though condition (14) guarantees that forgoing growth op-
portunities is inefficient under first-best. The reason is that exposing man-
agers to early termination risk increases the cost of incentivizing them. In the
continuous-time model, this is manifested by the fact that putting a manager
at risk of being replaced for the sake of growth effectively makes him more im-
patient, as revealed by the augmentation of the drift of the contractual promise
(which reflects the manager’s “effective” discount rate) from  to  + q. In the
presence of moral hazard, a firm thus faces an ex ante trade-off: A policy of
always standing ready to pursue growth by appointing a new, more suitable
manager has the advantage of producing higher expected cash flows, but it
also entails increased early termination risk for incumbent managers and a
higher cost of incentive provision during their tenure. In low-growth firms, the
resolution of the trade-off between efficient turnover and the cost of incentive
provision gives rise to an interior solution whereby the optimal contract allows
for job protection after good performance.32
C. High-Growth Firms
In this section, we further characterize the optimal contract offered by a high-
growth firm. To this end, we consider the free-boundary problem that consists
of finding a free-boundary point wc and a function u that satisfies the ordinary
differential equation (ODE)
σ 2λ2
2
u′′(w)+ ( + q)wu′(w)− (r + q)u(w)+ μ + q[(1+ γ )u(wh)− κ] = 0 (31)
in the interval (0, wc), is given by
u(w) = u(wc)− (w − wc), if w > wc, (32)
and satisfies the boundary conditions
u(0) = u(wh)− κ, u′(wc) = −1, and u′′(wc) = 0, (33)
31 The manager being partially shielded from the risk of growth-induced turnover might be
described as an endogenous form of “entrenchment.” We do not use this terminology because it
more commonly refers to actions taken by a manager to make his replacement costly. A number
of recent papers explore frameworks very different from ours where they establish conditions
under which managers are protected from termination (see, for example, Atkeson and Cole (2008),
Casamatta and Guembel (2010), and Garrett and Pavan (2012)).
32 A third possible configuration involves fully isolating managers from the risk of growth-
induced termination, which corresponds to (30) being violated for all values ofw ∈ [0, wc]. However,
we show in Internet Appendix Section VI.E that this no-growth policy can be optimal only if
v(wh) < 0, so that the firm would rather not operate. We do not expand on this case further in the
remainder of our analysis.
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where
wh = w¯ ∨ argmax
w>0
u(w). (34)
PROPOSITION 4: Given any permissible values of (r, , μ, σ,q, γ, λ, κ, w¯) in R9,
there exists a unique solution (u, wc) to the free-boundary problem defined by
(31) to (34). The function u is C2 and concave, and satisfies the HJB equation
max
{
σ 2λ2
2
u′′(w)+ ( + q)wu′(w)− (r + q)u(w)+ μ + q[(1+ γ )u(wh)− κ],
−u′(w)− 1
}
= 0.
Furthermore, the following statements hold:
i. The set of permissible parameter values over which u satisfies (30) for all
w ∈ [0, wc], and therefore the HJB equation (28), has nonempty interior
in R9.
ii. There exists a unique point w¯† = w¯†( +qσ 2λ2 , r+qσ 2λ2 , κ) such that
w◦ := argmaxw>0u(w) ≥ w¯ ⇔ w¯ ≤ w¯† and w◦ = w¯ ⇔ w¯ = w¯†.
iii. There exists a unique point w¯‡ = w¯‡( +qσ 2λ2 , r+qσ 2λ2 , κ) > w¯† such that
wc ≥ wh ⇔ w¯ ≤ w¯‡ and wc = wh = w¯ ⇔ w¯ = w¯‡.
iv. If w¯ = w¯‡, u satisfies (30) for all w ∈ [0, wc] and the HJB equation (28) if
and only if
γμ ≥ rκ + (r + γ )w¯. (35)
PROOF: See Internet Appendix Section VI.B. 
In view of Proposition 3 and the general properties of the solution to the
free-boundary problem established in Proposition 4, statement (i) implies that,
for a large set of permissible parameter values, the firm is of the high-growth
type. For such parameter values, the firm’s size-adjusted value function and
the optimal compensation threshold are given, along with the hiring promise,
by the solution to the free-boundary problem in (31) to (34). Figure 1 illustrates
the firm’s value function and the optimal compensation threshold in the high-
growth configuration for particular parameter values.
Statement (ii) establishes the condition under which it is optimal for a high-
growth firm to grant a new manager a compensation rent in excess of his
reservation value. The hiring promise wh is optimally set above the manager’s
reservation promise w¯ when the latter is sufficiently low, that is, w¯ ≤ w¯†. In
this case, the initial promise wh is equal to the level w◦ ≥ w¯ that maximizes the
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Figure 1. Value function, high-growth firm. The figure depicts the firm’s value function and
the optimal compensation threshold wc for parameter values r = 7%,  = 16%, μ = 1, σ = 1,
q = 0.2, γ = 0.25, λ = 0.4, κ = 0.3, and w¯ = 1. The firm’s value function and the compensation
threshold are determined by solving the free-boundary problem defined by (31) to (34). The growth
optimality condition (30) holds for all values of the manager’s promise. (Color figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com)
firm’s value. Otherwise, the manager’s participation constraint is binding so
that the hiring promise coincides with his reservation value (i.e., wh = w¯ > w◦).
Statement (iii) sheds light on the optimal compensation policy at the start
of a manager’s tenure. Depending on the value of the reservation promise
w¯, three scenarios can arise. When the reservation value is relatively low, in
the sense that w¯ < w¯‡, the compensation threshold is optimally set above the
hiring promise (wc > wh). In this case, a newly hired manager does not receive
any pay until the effect of the positive drift  + q, possibly combined with
good cash flow realizations, finally raises his promise up to the compensation
threshold wc. In contrast, if the reservation promise is high enough (w¯ > w¯‡),
a manager receives a signing bonus 
C0 = w¯ − wc > 0 when appointed. In the
case in which w¯ = w¯‡, the hiring promise and compensation threshold are such
thatwc = wh = w¯, and themanager starts receiving compensation immediately
after taking office.
Statement (iv) provides an explicit condition on exogenous parameter val-
ues for the firm to be a high-growth firm. Condition (35) suggests that high-
growth firms tend to be the ones that are more productive (high μ) or have
better opportunities (high γ ). Our next proposition gives further insight into
the characteristics of high-growth firms.
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PROPOSITION 5: Consider any permissible values of (r, , μ, σ,q, γ, λ, κ, w¯) in R9
such that w¯ = w¯‡ and condition (35) holds with equality. A marginal increase
in λ, σ , or κ, or a marginal decrease in γ , q, or μ, leads condition (35) to fail.
PROOF: See Internet Appendix Section VI.C. 
In view of statement (iv), the above proposition suggests that high-growth
firms also tend to be characterized by not-too-severe moral hazard and low
turnover costs (low λ and κ). These results confirm the insights derived in
the two-period framework (see Lemma 4).33 Proposition 5 further suggests
that frequent growth opportunities (high q) and not-too-volatile cash flows
(low σ ) are other attributes of high-growth firms. In particular, because of the
cumulative nature of growth in our stationary environment, more frequent
growth opportunities makes it more valuable to pursue any such opportunity.
Finally, we characterize the determinants of the compensation threshold in
high-growth firms with the following proposition. At this point, it is worth
noting that, holding the dynamics of the manager’s promise constant, a lower
(higher) compensation threshold results in more front-loaded (back-loaded)
compensation.
PROPOSITION 6: Consider (r, , μ, σ,q, γ, λ, κ, w¯) in the interior of the set of per-
missible parameter values over which the firm is a high-growth firm.
i. The optimal compensation threshold wc is increasing in κ and is indepen-
dent of μ and γ .
ii. If the parameter values are initially such that w¯ = w¯‡, then a marginal
increase in λ or σ leads to an increase in wc, whereas a marginal increase
in q leads to a reduction in wc.
PROOF: See Internet Appendix Section VI.D. 
As the severity of moral hazard, the volatility of cash flows, or the cost of
managerial replacement increases, the compensation threshold is raised to
reduce the likelihood of inefficient turnover. On the other hand, an increase in
the arrival rate of growth opportunities, by increasing the manager’s effective
discount rate, results in a lower compensation threshold. Furthermore, the
quality of growth opportunities, γ , has no impact on the optimal compensation
scheme conditional on the firm being of the high-growth type, although it may
affect the shape of the compensation profile to the extent that it alters the firm’s
growth regime (as in the two-period model).34 We illustrate the implications of
our model for the timing of compensation in Section III.E.
33 The assumption w¯ = w¯‡, under which Propositions 5 and 6(ii) are derived, implies the iden-
tities wc = wh = w¯, which facilitate the proofs of our results. Establishing such results globally is
beyond the scope of this paper.
34 The result that the threshold wc is unaffected by the mean size-adjusted cash flow μ differs
from the result derived in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), where wc is increasing in μ. This is
because the firm’s continuation value upon termination is exogenously given in their setup, whereas
it is endogenously determined in ours.
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D. Low-Growth Firms
We now turn to the low-growth configuration. In light of Proposition 3 and
Property 5, we consider the free-boundary problem that consists of finding two
free-boundary points wc and wg < wc and a function u that satisfies the ODE
σ 2λ2
2
u′′(w)+ ( + q)wu′(w)− (r + q)u(w)+ μ + q[(1+ γ )u(wh)− κ] = 0 (36)
in the interval (0, wg), satisfies the ODE
σ 2λ2
2
u′′(w)+ wu′(w)− ru(w)+ μ = 0 (37)
in the interval (wg, wc), is given by
u(w) = u(wc)− (w − wc), if w > wc, (38)
satisfies the boundary conditions given by (33), and satisfies the requirement
that
u(wg)− wgu′(wg) = (1+ γ )u(wh)− κ, (39)
wherewh is defined as in (34). The analysis of this problem allows us to establish
that, despite the assumption that forgoing growth opportunities is suboptimal
under first-best, the low-growth configuration can arise, as stated in the fol-
lowing proposition.
PROPOSITION 7: The set of permissible parameter values over which the solution
u to the free-boundary problem defined by (33)–(34) and (36)–(39) is C2 and
concave, and satisfies the HJB equation (28), has nonempty interior in R9. For
such parameter values, the firm is a low-growth firm.
PROOF: See Internet Appendix Section VII.C. 
In low-growth firms, the optimal contract is as described in Section III.B,
with growth and compensation thresholds given by the free-boundary points
wg, wc of the free-boundary problem defined above and with the hiring promise
wh endogenously determined as part of the problem.35 Figure 2 depicts the
firm’s value function along with the optimal thresholds in the low-growth con-
figuration for particular parameter values. The figure also represents what the
value of the firm would be if it were constrained to systematically pursue all
growth opportunities as they come. The distance between the two curves in
the figure illustrates the benefit that a low-growth firm derives from offering
partial job protection to its managers, which can ultimately be traced back to
a reduction in agency costs.
35 In Internet Appendix Section VII.A, we derive five possible systems of highly nonlinear equa-
tions that should be solved to determine the points wg, wc, and wh; see in particular Problem IA4.
Given the complexity of this problem, providing a complete characterization of its solution to derive
a suitable solution to the HJB equation (28) with boundary condition (29) is beyond the scope of
this paper.
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Figure 2. Value function, low-growth firm. The figure depicts the firm’s value function (solid
line), alongwith the optimal growth and compensation thresholds (wg, wc), for parameter values r =
7%,  = 16%, μ = 1, σ = 1, q = 0.2, γ = 0.1, λ = 0.4, κ = 0.3, and w¯ = 1. The firm’s value function
and the thresholds are determined by solving the free-boundary problem defined by (36) to (39)
alongwith (33) and (34). The growth optimality condition (30) holds on [0, wg] but is violated forw >
wg. The figure also plots what firm value would be if the firm were constrained to pursue all growth
opportunities (dashed line), with the compensation threshold optimally determined by the solution
to the high-growth free-boundary problem. (Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com)
It is worth noting that, our finding that, in some firms, growth may occur
only after poor performance contrasts with the result obtained in setups where
the firm can grow through investment with the incumbent (see, e.g., DeMarzo
and Fishman (2007a)). In such settings, growth is positively related to past
performance because the return on investment is higher after good cash flows,
due to a reduction in agency costs. The opposite prediction arises in our setup
because the net benefit of exposing a manager to the risk of growth-induced
termination is lower after good performance, also due to a reduction in agency
costs. In practice, the relevance of these two mechanisms should depend on
the extent to which growth is of a “transformative” nature, that is, on whether
pursuing a growth opportunity requires a change in management.36
36 The investment–cash flow sensitivity literature points to a positive relationship between
investment and past performance. However, these studies do not shed light on the empirical
validity of the mechanism at play in our model because they do not account for the fact that firms
may grow as a result of marginal changes or of radical transformations requiring a change in top
management, nor do they account for the possibility that the firm’s value may increase without
capital investment.
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E. A Numerical Example
Wenow use numerical simulations to illustrate how a firm’s growth prospects
may affect managerial turnover and compensation in our setup. The numerical
example also provides a sense of the quantitative properties of the continuous-
time model.
Frequency of Managerial Turnover. In our setting, the probability of an in-
cumbent manager being dismissed depends on the past performance of the firm
under his tenure, as well as on the availability of a growth opportunity and on
the ex ante firm characteristics that affect its turnover policy. First, the like-
lihood of dismissal increases with poor performance—both because a string of
bad cash flows can result in disciplinary turnover and because, in some firms,
growth-induced turnover occurs only after poor performance. Second, holding
performance and firm characteristics constant, the probability of dismissal
also increases (at least weakly) upon arrival of a growth opportunity. Finally,
the probability of turnover depends on firm characteristics, to the extent that
they affect the contract specification and the degree of protection granted to
the manager. In particular, firms with better growth prospects should have a
higher turnover rate.
To see this last point, consider two firms that are identical in every dimension
except for the size (γ ) of the growth opportunities they might receive. For the
sake of illustration, we take as common parameter values across the two firms
r = 7%,  = 16%, μ = 1, σ = 1, q = 0.2, λ = 0.4, κ = 0.3, and w¯ = 1. In the firm
with better growth prospects, we set γ = 0.25; we set γ = 0.10 in the other
firm.37 The difference in the quality of growth opportunities faced by the two
firms makes the former a high-growth firm (i.e., a manager in this firm is
never immune to the risk of growth-induced termination), and the latter a
low-growth firm (i.e., managers are protected from growth-induced turnover
after good performance). The average annualized turnover rate in these two
firms is 21.4% and 5.5%, respectively. Changes in growth prospects driven by
the arrival rate (q) of growth opportunities have similar effects. To see this,
consider variations in q around the high-growth and low-growth baselines.
For the high-growth firm, an increase in the frequency of growth opportunities
from q = 0.20 to q = 0.22 causes the average turnover rate to increase to 23.2%,
while a decrease to q = 0.18 causes the turnover rate to drop to 19.4%. For the
low-growth firm, the same variations in q cause the average turnover rate to
rise to 5.7% or to drop to 5.3%, respectively.
37 These parameter values are permissible. In particular, the firms’ growth prospects are suf-
ficiently attractive as to make pursuing all growth opportunities optimal in the absence of moral
hazard. Discount rates r and , and intensity rate q, are expressed on an annual basis. Given the
normalizationμ = 1, parameters σ , κ, and w¯ are effectively expressed in terms of annualmean cash
flow. For given parameter values, we first determine the firm’s type and the optimal contractual
threshold(s) by solving numerically the free-boundary problems associated with the HJB equation
(28) with boundary condition (29). The average turnover rate is then obtained by simulating the
dynamics of the promise W under the optimal contract until dismissal for a very large number of
managers.
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Figure 3. Distribution of tenure length: high-growth vs. low-growth firms. The figure
depicts model-implied cumulative distribution functions obtained from simulations for parameter
values r = 7%,  = 16%, μ = 1, σ = 1, q = 0.2, γ = 0.25 (high-growth) or γ = 0.10 (low-growth),
λ = 0.4, κ = 0.3, and w¯ = 1. Optimal contractual thresholds are wc = 1.24 in the high-growth case,
and wg = 0.92 and wc = 1.36 in the low-growth case. In both cases, the hiring promise wh coincides
with the reservation promise w¯. (Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com)
Figure 3 depicts the cumulative distribution of tenure length in the two
baseline examples. The probability distribution of tenure length for the low-
growth firm first-order stochastically dominates the one for the high-growth
firm, that is, the probability of a manager reaching any given number of tenure
years is higher in the low-growth firm. The median tenure length of a manager
is 3.3 years in the firm with better growth prospects (γ = 0.25), whereas it is
12.6 years in the firm with poorer growth prospects (γ = 0.10). Changes in the
quality of growth prospects driven by the arrival rate of growth opportunities
q affect tenure length in a similar way: increasing the frequency of growth
opportunities from q = 0.20 to q = 0.22 causes the median time in office to
drop to 3.0 years and 12.1 years, respectively, whereas a decrease to q = 0.18
causes the median time in office to rise to 3.6 years and 13.1 years, respectively.
Extent of Compensation Back-Loading. Deferred compensation constitutes
an essential feature of the optimal dynamic contract under moral hazard. It is
well understood that the degree of compensation back-loading should depend on
the severity of moral hazard (λ), cash flow volatility (σ ), and the wedge between
the manager’s and the firm’s discount rates ( − r). In our setup, the extent of
back-loading also depends on the likelihood of growth-induced turnover. Firms’
growth prospects may affect the timing of compensation both through the drift
of the manager’s promise and the level of the compensation threshold.
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Figure 4. Distribution of realized compensation duration: high-growth vs. low-growth
firms. The figure depicts model-implied cumulative distribution functions obtained from simu-
lations for parameter values r = 7%,  = 16%, μ = 1, σ = 1, q = 0.2, γ = 0.25 (high-growth) or
γ = 0.10 (low-growth), λ = 0.4, κ = 0.3, and w¯ = 1. Optimal contractual thresholds are wc = 1.24
in the high-growth case, and wg = 0.92 and wc = 1.36 in the low-growth case. In both cases, the
hiring promise wh coincides with the reservation promise w¯. (Color figure can be viewed at wiley-
onlinelibrary.com)
To illustrate this aspect of our model, we simulate managerial pay under
the optimal contract and characterize the degree of compensation back-loading
using the notion of compensation duration. In particular, for a given sequence
of bonuses received by a manager over his tenure, we compute the weighted
average of the points in time when compensation is received—with weights
equal to the fraction of the total discounted pay (using the agent’s discount rate
) received at each point in time.38 Figure 4 depicts the cumulative distribution
of realized compensation duration in the two baseline configurations introduced
earlier in this section. The relative position of the two distributions reflects the
fact that, holding the level of expected discounted pay w¯ constant across firms,
compensation is more front-loaded in firms with better growth prospects. On
average, compensation duration is 2.2 years in the high-growth firm, versus
4.8 years in the low-growth firm. Similarly, we find that an increase in the
arrival rate of growth opportunities (q) also results in lower compensation
duration.
38 Compensation duration is formally defined as (
∫ τ
0 e
−t dCt)−1
∫ τ
0 te
−t dCt, in line with the no-
tion of bond duration used in interest rate risk management. In simulations, we use the discretized
version of this expression.
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IV. Empirical Evidence
In this section, we present evidence consistent with the notion of growth-
induced turnover and the empirical implications derived in the context of the
two-period framework in Section I.B and illustrated for the continuous-time
model in Section III.E. We first investigate the empirical determinants of CEO
turnover in light of the theory. We then explore the relation between the timing
of CEO compensation and firms’ growth prospects.
A. Data
Our empirical analysis relies on information on CEO tenure episodes in U.S.
public firms as reported in Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database for the
period 1992 to 2014.39 After merging the ExecuComp sample with accounting
information from Compustat and stock return data from CRSP, our sample
comprises 4,514 CEO episodes. Of these, 2,510 episodes cover the full tenure of
the CEO from beginning to end. The total number of CEO-year observations in
our sample is 27,992.40 The minimum number of firms covered in a given year
is 760 in 1992 and the maximum is 1,416 in 2005.
Using information fromExecuComp, we identify the beginning and end years
of each completed CEO episode. The variable TotTenure is defined as the total
number of years the CEO runs the firm. Within an episode, Turnover is a
dummy variable that equals one in the last year of the CEO’s tenure and
zero otherwise. We also use Execucomp to construct TotPay, which is the total
compensation awarded to a CEO in a given year. Table I reports summary
statistics for our sample. The average and median CEO tenure lengths are 6.5
years and 5 years, respectively, while the average annual turnover rate is 8.4%.
Our analysis centers on CEO turnover and the timing of CEO compensation
in relation to the quality of a firm’s growth prospects. Our empirical proxy for
a firm’s growth prospects during a given CEO episode is based on the “average
Q” of the firm. The use of average Q to proxy for a firm’s growth opportunities
is standard in the empirical corporate finance literature.41 We construct the
average Q for each firm-year in our sample and denote it simply by Q. As
a proxy for the quality of growth prospects during a given episode, we use
39 The ExecuComp database covers all firms included in the S&P 500, MidCap, and SmallCap
indexes. It would be interesting to extend the analysis to smaller public firms and private firms.
Kaplan, Sensoy, and Stromberg (2008) document high turnover in the management teams of VC-
backed private companies before going public.
40 All CEO-year observations are from 1992 onwards. While the ExecuComp data set starts in
1992, it covers episodes in which the CEO was appointed earlier. Our sample includes observations
pertaining to such episodes when the required information (e.g., the firm’s average Q at the time
the CEO was appointed) is available.
41 The handbook by Eckbo (2001) surveys multiple studies in which average Q is used as a
proxy for growth opportunities. This practice stems from Hayashi (1982), who derives sufficient
conditions such that a firm’s average Q coincides with its marginal product of capital. See Caballero
(1997) and Bond and Van Reenen (2007) for surveys of the empirical literature assessing the links
between average Q, marginal q, and investment.
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Table I
Summary Statistics
The table reports summary sample statistics for the merged ExecuComp/Compustat/CRSP data
set, which covers CEO episodes reported in ExecuComp over the period 1992 to 2014. TotTenure is
the total number of tenure years for CEO episodes that are completed within the sample period.
Turnover is a dummy variable that equals one in the last year of a CEO’s tenure and zero otherwise.
LnTotPay is the logarithm of total CEO compensation awarded in a given calendar year. QInit is
the average Q of the firm in the year before the CEO was appointed; the same value is repeated
throughout each CEO episode. RatioQ is the ratio of the lagged average Q of a firm in a given year
divided by QInit. CAR is the two-year cumulative abnormal return of the firm (annualized). ROA
is return on assets. LnAssets is the logarithm of the book value of total assets. Variable definitions
are provided in the main text and in Internet Appendix Section VIII.
Variable Mean SD p25 p50 p75 N
TotTenure 6.492 5.001 3.000 5.000 9.000 2,510
Turnover 0.084 0.278 0.000 0.000 0.000 27,992
LnTotPay 7.915 1.053 7.172 7.927 8.663 27,958
QInit 1.788 1.212 1.099 1.371 1.981 27,992
RatioQ 1.069 0.420 0.876 1.000 1.164 27,992
CAR −0.001 0.244 −0.147 −0.005 0.129 27,992
ROA 0.038 0.078 0.013 0.040 0.075 27,992
LnAssets 7.700 1.699 6.452 7.602 8.887 27,992
the value of Q in the year before the CEO is appointed, which we denote by
QInit. We interpret a higher value of QInit as capturing better ex ante growth
prospects at the time a new CEO is hired.
Managerial turnover in our setup is also affected by the availability of growth
opportunities. Capturing the arrival of a growth opportunity in any given year
during a CEO episode is challenging empirically. As a proxy, we construct
RatioQ as the ratio of the lagged value of a firm’s Q in any given year to
QInit. A higher value of RatioQ is more likely when the firm has new growth
opportunities available.
To control for past performance in any given year within a CEO episode, we
use the cumulative abnormal return of the firm measured over the previous
two years, which we denote by CAR.42 We also consider lagged return on assets
(ROA) as an additional control for performance. Finally, we use the logarithm
of lagged total assets (LnAssets) to control for firm size.
B. Determinants of CEO Turnover
We first examine the relation between turnover and the quality of growth
prospects. As a first pass, Figure 5 depicts the cumulative distribution of CEO
tenure length conditional on ex ante growth prospects as proxied by QInit.
The solid line plots the kernel estimate of the distribution for the upper 20% of
42 Our qualitative results are unaffected when we use one-year or three-year cumulative abnor-
mal returns as a measure of past performance, or when we remove the initial years of a CEO’s
tenure from the sample. Our results are also robust to the use of industry-level measures of Q in
the construction of QInit and RatioQ.
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Figure 5. Distribution of CEO tenure length conditional on initial growth prospects.
The figure depicts kernel estimates of the empirical cumulative distribution of CEO tenure length
(TotTenure) for two subsamples. The first subsample (“Low QInit”) consists of the bottom quintile
of CEO episodes sorted by initial Q; the corresponding distribution is plotted as a dashed line. The
second subsample (“High QInit”) consists of the top quintile of episodes sorted by initial Q; the
corresponding distribution is plotted as a solid line. Variable definitions are provided in the main
text and in Internet Appendix Section VIII. (Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com)
CEO episodes ranked byQInit, whereas the dashed line corresponds to the bot-
tom 20%. The two-sample Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test both confirm the visual impression that the two samples are
drawn from different distributions. The cumulative distribution for the upper
QInit subsample lies significantly above that for the bottom QInit subsample.
That is, the likelihood that a CEO will not “survive” beyond any number of
years is higher for CEOs entering firms with good growth prospects than for
CEOs entering firms with poor growth prospects, consistent with the notion of
growth-induced turnover. Figure 5 constitutes the empirical counterpart to the
simulation results depicted in Figure 3.
Next, we assess the implications of our model for managerial turnover by
running a probit regression. The probit specification is
Prob(Turnover j,t = 1) = [ψ0 + ψ1QInit j + ψ2RatioQj,t−1 + ψ3CARj,t−1
+ α′X j,t−1],
where  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, j denotes
a CEO episode, t denotes the calendar year, and X denotes a vector of control
variables. We control for the return on assets and the size of the firm, both
lagged one year. Calendar year fixed effects are also included. We do not include
firm or industry fixed effects in the probit to avoid the incidental parameters
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Table II
Determinants of CEO Turnover
The table reports evidence on the probability of CEO turnover from the probit regression estimated
over the merged ExecuComp/Compustat/CRSP data set from 1992 to 2014. The dependent variable
is the Turnover indicator variable. QInit is the average Q of the firm in the year before the CEO
was appointed; the same value is repeated throughout each CEO episode. RatioQ is the ratio of
the lagged average Q of the firm in a given year divided by QInit. CAR is the two-year cumulative
abnormal return of the firm (annualized) over the previous two years. ROA is return on assets,
lagged one year. LnAssets is the logarithm of the lagged book value of total assets. Calendar year
fixed effects are included in the regression. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are
shown in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
(1) (2) (3)
Coefficients
b/SE
Marginal
Effects b/SE
Coefficients of Variation (in
Percentage Points)
QInit 0.047*** 0.007*** 0.848
(0.009) (0.001)
RatioQ 0.089*** 0.014*** 0.588
(0.030) (0.005)
CAR −0.595*** −0.090*** −2.196
(0.053) (0.008)
ROA −0.806*** −0.122*** −0.952
(0.131) (0.020)
LnAssets 0.040*** 0.006*** 1.019
(0.006) (0.001)
N 27,992 27,992 27,992
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
problem that arises in the context of nonlinear panel models.43 In view of the
comparative static results derived in Proposition 1, we hypothesize that the
coefficients on QInit and RatioQ should be positive, while the coefficients on
CAR and ROA should be negative.
Table II summarizes the results of the probit regression. Column (1) reports
the estimated coefficients of the probit model and their standard errors. All
explanatory variables have the expected signs and are highly statistically sig-
nificant. The coefficient on QInit is positive, in line with our model’s prediction
that turnover is more frequent in firms with better ex ante growth prospects.
The coefficient on RatioQ is also positive, in line with the idea that turnover is
sometimes triggered by the arrival of growth opportunities. Finally, the coef-
ficients on CAR and ROA are negative, in line with the theoretical prediction
that turnover is more likely after poor performance.
Column (2) reports the impliedmarginal effects, which give the impact on the
probability of turnover of a one-unit increase in an explanatory variable when
all variables are evaluated at the sample means. In Column (3), the marginal
43 See Woolridge (2002) for a textbook treatment. Earlier studies of CEO turnover by Kaplan
and Minton (2012) and Jenter and Lewellen (2014) employ probit specifications similar to ours. In
practice, when controlling for firm- or industry-level fixed effects, our qualitative conclusions are
unaffected.
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Table III
Initial Growth Prospects and Growth-Induced Turnover
The table reports the marginal effect of RatioQ on the likelihood of turnover for different lev-
els of initial average Q, as implied by the probit model estimated over the merged Execu-
Comp/Compustat/CRSP data set from 1992 to 2014. QInit is the average Q of the firm in the
year before the CEO was appointed. RatioQ is the ratio of lagged Q in a given year divided by
QInit. The marginal effect of RatioQ is evaluated at different quantiles of the distribution of QInit.
Low, Median, and High quantiles correspond to the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentiles of the distri-
bution of QInit, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are shown in
parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
Marginal Effect of RatioQ
b/SE
Low QInit 0.0124***
(0.0040)
Median QInit 0.0126***
(0.0041)
High QInit 0.0133***
(0.0044)
N 27,992
effects are multiplied by the sample standard deviation of the corresponding
explanatory variables. A one-standard-deviation increase inQInit is associated
with an increase in the probability of turnover of 85 basis points. Similarly, a
one-standard-deviation increase in RatioQ leads to a 59 basis point increase in
the probability of turnover. Since the unconditional frequency of CEO turnover
in our sample is 8.4%, these results support the view that the growth-related
drivers of managerial turnover emphasized in this paper are economically sig-
nificant. Of course, this is in addition to the disciplinary role of turnover, which
we also find to be important. In our sample, a one-standard-deviation increase
in past abnormal returns is associated with a decrease in the probability of
turnover of 2.2 percentage points.
An additional implication of our model is a tendency for firms with relatively
poor ex ante growth prospects to grant partial job protection to their CEOs. That
is, our theory predicts that in such firms, a CEO is less likely to be dismissed
for the sake of growth when an opportunity arises calling for his replacement.
We explore the empirical validity of this prediction by evaluating the marginal
effect of RatioQ on the probability of CEO turnover at different levels of QInit.
According to Proposition 1(iii), the impact of RatioQ on turnover should be
greater for firms with relatively better ex ante growth prospects, that is, for
higher values ofQInit. Table III reports these differential marginal effects. The
marginal effect of RatioQ is strictly positive at all levels of QInit and is indeed
increasing in QInit.
C. Growth Prospects and CEO Compensation
A key insight from our theory is that the managers of firms with better
and more frequent growth opportunities should have more front-loaded
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Figure 6. Distribution of CEO pay duration conditional on initial growth prospects. The
figure depicts kernel estimates of the empirical cumulative distribution of realized compensation
duration (PayDuration) for the bottom and top quintiles of CEO episodes sorted by initial Q (QInit),
denoted by “LowQInit” and “HighQInit,” respectively. Variable definitions are provided in themain
text and in Internet Appendix Section VIII. (Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com)
compensation. In this subsection, we provide evidence on the empirical
relation between CEO compensation and firms’ growth prospects. We explore
the data in two ways.
As a first pass, we compute a measure of realized compensation duration for
each CEO episode and investigate how it varies across episodes that differ in
terms of the firm’s growth prospects at the time the CEO was appointed. For a
given CEO episode j lasting Nj years, our measure of compensation duration,
PayDuration, is obtained as
PayDurationj =
Nj∑
n=1
DiscPayj,n∑Nj
k=1 DiscPayj,k
× n, (40)
where DiscPayj,n = TotPay j,n/(1+ )n corresponds to the present value of the
compensation received by the CEO in his nth tenure year. Setting the discount
rate  to 10%, we find that, in the subsample of episodes over which this
measure is computed, average CEO compensation duration is 3.7 years, while
the median is 3.2 years.
Figure 6 provides an empirical counterpart to Figure 4, depicting kernel
estimates of the cumulative distribution of PayDuration conditional on ex ante
growth prospects proxied by QInit. The solid line pertains to the upper 20%
of QInit in our sample, while the dashed line pertains to the bottom 20%. The
cumulative distribution for the upper QInit subsample lies above that for the
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Table IV
Determinants of CEO Compensation
This table reports evidence on the profile of CEO compensation over tenure. LnTotPay is the
logarithm of total CEO pay awarded in a given year as reported in ExecuComp. TenureYear is
the number of years in tenure of the CEO in a given calendar year. QInit is the average Q of the
firm in the year before the CEO was appointed. CAR is the two-year cumulative abnormal return
of the firm (annualized) over the previous two years. ROA is return on assets, lagged one year.
LnAssets is the logarithm of the lagged book value of total assets. The regression is estimated over
all episode-year observations in our sample, some of which pertain to CEO episodes that have not
finished by the end of the sample period. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are
shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
(1) (2)
LnTotPay LnTotPay
TenureYear 0.017*** 0.008*
(0.004) (0.003)
QInit 0.073*** 0.054***
(0.011) (0.014)
QInit × TenureYear −0.008*** −0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
CAR 0.556*** 0.435***
(0.026) (0.026)
LnAssets 0.430*** 0.199***
(0.007) (0.019)
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes No
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
R2 0.532 0.663
N 27,615 27,615
bottomQInit subsample, which is consistent with ourmodel’s insight that firms
with better growth prospects should have more front-loaded compensation.44
To further investigate how profiles of CEO pay over tenure vary with firms’
growth prospects, we consider the regression
Ln(TotPay j,t) = ψ0 + ψ1 TenureYear j,t + ψ2 QInitj +
+ ψ3 QInitj × TenureYear j,t + α′X j,t−1 +  j,t,
where j denotes a CEO episode, t denotes the calendar year, TenureYear j,t
(TotPay j,t) denotes the tenure of the CEO in year t (the total compensation
received by the CEO in that year), and X denotes a vector of control variables.
We control for past performance and firm size, as well as for calendar year
44 The results from the two-sample Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and from the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test both confirm that the difference between the two empirical distributions is statisti-
cally significant. Furthermore, controlling for year fixed effects, PayDuration and QInit are signif-
icantly negatively correlated across CEO episodes. When also controlling for firm fixed effects, the
correlation remains negative but becomes insignificant due to the small number of observations.
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fixed effects and industry or firm fixed effects. Our theory predicts (see Propo-
sition 2(iii)) that firms with better ex ante growth prospects are characterized
by a higher initial level of pay per period (i.e., ψ2 positive) and slower growth in
compensation over tenure (i.e., ψ3 negative). Table IV summarizes our empiri-
cal findings for two alternative specifications that control for industry and firm
fixed effects, respectively. The coefficients of interest are significant with the
expected signs, and the results are very similar across both specifications. We
also note that the coefficient on past abnormal returns is positive and signifi-
cant, in line with the theoretical prediction that CEO pay is positively related
to past performance.
V. Conclusion
This paper introduces growth-induced turnover in a dynamic moral haz-
ard framework and analyzes the interaction between this type of turnover
and managerial incentive provision. In our model, growth opportunities arrive
stochastically over time and the firm must appoint a new manager to be able
to seize them. Our analysis highlights the trade-off that a firm faces between
the benefit of always having a manager who is the right man for the job at
hand and the cost of incentive provision. The key new insight is that exposing
incumbent managers to the risk of growth-induced dismissal effectively in-
creases their discount rate and thus the cost of incentive provision. As a result,
some firms find it optimal to provide managers some degree of job protection,
at the cost of forgoing growth opportunities. Across firms, a higher likelihood
of growth-induced turnover translates into a greater tendency to front-load
compensation. Our empirical findings are consistent with these predictions of
the model.
An essential feature of ourmodel is that nondisciplinarymanagerial turnover
can be triggered by the firm contingent on the arrival of exogenous contractible
shocks. In our setup, shocks correspond to the arrival of growth opportuni-
ties, and it is first-best efficient for the firm to replace the incumbent manager
upon arrival of a growth opportunity. Our analysis could be applied to alterna-
tive forms of exogenous contractible shocks. First, transformative managerial
change may also be important for firms in decline. For instance, a change in
managementmay be required for a firm to respond to increased product market
competition or to the threat of a disruptive new technology. Second, the firm
may face opportunities to transform—through a change in management—that
would bring gains that are too modest to outweigh the cost of implement-
ing them, so that they would not be taken up under first-best. However, in
a second-best world, it may be optimal to take these inefficient opportunities
when the agency costs associated with the current manager are high. We be-
lieve that a number of theoretical insights of the paper would carry through in
these alternative settings, although the empirical implications would be quite
different.
The existing empirical literature on managerial turnover and compensation
has been informed mostly by two paradigms from the contracting literature—
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the moral hazard model in which pay and dismissal are used to incentivize
the agent, and the learning model in which the principal learns about the
unknown quality of the agent over time. In our view, transformative change
can be another powerful driver of managerial turnover and compensation. We
document that firms with better growth prospects experience higher CEO
turnover and rely on more front-loaded compensation schemes. These find-
ings are consistent with the assumption of growth-induced turnover and the
predictions of our model. Nonetheless, other theories may be consistent with
these findings. Identifying the specific channel through which firms’ growth
prospects relate to CEO turnover and compensation deserves further empirical
work.
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